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I am honored to have been asked to give the closing remarks to what has 
been an inspiring and insightful conference, and humbled to do so before so 
many respected friends and colleagues. 
I think my most important duty before doing so is to thank the truly amaz-
ing students who conceived of and executed this conference from start to finish: 
Brian Highsmith, Lina Khan, Urja Mittal, and Jake Struebing, and also all of the 
student moderators too. 
I also want to thank all the marvelous panelists who traveled from far and 
near to be here with us. It has meant so much for us to have you share your 
thinking and research on these urgent questions. And a particular thank you to 
those who gave the keynote and lunchtime addresses-Vanita Gupta, Zephyr 
Teachout, Justice Goodwin Liu, and Daniel Markovits. 
It has been a fantastic conference-and for that reason, I will not prevail 
upon your alertness too much at the end of a long day, but will simply offer a 
few remarks about what I have heard and learned, and will try to connect that 
with some of the things I have been thinking about recently. 
It might be easiest to begin with how we got to this point: to a large, well-
attended conference on law and inequality at Yale Law School, in which my fel-
low panelists have. called for experimenting with new forms of democracy, 
transformative socioeconomic changes, and a renewed and deepened commit-
ment to the rule of law. I must say, if you would have told me ten years ago that 
we would be having this conversation in this hallowed room, I would have 
doubted it. Of course, Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton were having a rather 
similar conversation on national television just a few days ago, so the first lesson 
is that we should always be ready for surprises. 
For me, and I suspect for many in this room, the immediate prompt to 
thinking about law and inequality was the vigorous conversation about eco-
nomic inequality that Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
kicked off last year. 1 For all that remains contentious in the book, its extraordi-
nary reception seemed to lift a stigma from discussions of inequality in main-
1. 
Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I would like to thank the organizers of the con-
ference and the editors of the Yale Law & Policy Review for their inspiration and 
assistance-in particular, Brian Highsmith, Lina Khan, Urja Mittal, and Jake 
Struebing. I am grateful to Jedediah Purdy for help with an early version of these 
remarks. 
THOMAS PIKETIY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). 
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stream and even elite settings. Like many folks here-Jedediah Purdy, Amy 
Kapczynski, Daniel Markovits, Jacob Hacker, and others-I have drawn on 
Piketty's scholarship in my own written work. 2 I believe that my broadly sym-
pathetic review of Capital in the Twenty-First Century was probably behind the 
student organizers' decision to privilege me with these closing remarks. So I will 
use Piketty' s work as a frame for them. 3 
Piketty's book sparked an unusually rich set of debates about the conse-
quences of capitalist development and the production and reproduction of ine-
quality across several centuries. In brief, he found that over the past several cen-
turies, economic inequality has mostly increased across all the countries for 
which he had adequate data (meaning, mostly countries with relatively devel-
oped tax systems). The one exceptional period was the roughly three decades of 
post-war economic recovery, known by a variety of superlatives across different 
countries: the "post-war economic miracle" or the "Golden Age of Capital-
ism,"4-and translations or more particular names in France ("les trente glo-
rieuses"5), Germany ("wirtschaftwunder" 6 ), Italy ("miracolo economico"7 ), Japan 
("economic miracle"8), Sweden ("rekordaren" 9 ), and pretty much any other in-
2. See JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 14-20 (2010); 
DANIEL MARKOVITS, MERITOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS (forthcoming 2017); Da-
vid Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Neoliberalism and Law, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS.1, 21-23 (1015); Jedediah Purdy, Wealth, Inequality, and Democra-
cy, NOMOS (forthcoming); Amy Kapczynski, Four Hypotheses on Intellectual Prop-
erty and Inequality 1-4 (Working Paper Prepared for the SELA Conference, 2015), 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Kapczynski2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/7QPV-YSZW]). 
3. David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1014). 
4. STEPHEN MARGLIN & JULIET SCHOR, THE GOLDEN AGE OF CAPITALISM: 
REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE 41-46 ( 1990 ). 
5. JEAN FOURASTIE, LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES, OU LA REVOLUTION INVISIBLE DE 1946 A 
1975 (1979). For a retrospective on French post-war economic performance in the 
trente glorieuses, see JEAN PIERRE DORMAIS, THE FRENCH ECONOMY IN THE 
TwENTIETH CENTURY ch. 2 (1004). 
6. Rolf H. Dumke, Reassessing the Wirtschaftswunder: Reconstruction and Postwar 
Growth in West Germany in an International Context, 52 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & 
STAT. 451 (1990). 
7. VALERIO CASTRONOVO, L'ITALIA DEL MIRACOLO ECONOMICO (1014). 
8. See, e.g., Hugh Patrick & Henry Rosovsky, Understanding the Japanese Economic 
Miracle, 13 BROOKINGS BULL. 4 (1976). 
9. The use of the term "record years" to describe Sweden's post-war boom was, in 
fact, originally ironic-the title of a controversial documentary, Rekordaren 1966, 
1967, 1968 . .. , which criticized the ideal of constant growth. See Anders Kreuger, 
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dustrial country that saw exceptionally high growth rates and widely shared 
growth from roughly 1945-1975.10 
But the post-war boom was not to last. Starting in the 1970s and 198os-
and continuing through to today-inequality reasserted itself, with increasing 
vigor, and across a broad swathe of the world, even in European countries with 
much more progressive welfare states and government redistribution than the 
United States. 11 
This inequality has many consequences, including an increasing accumula-
tion of capital and concentration of its ownership; a higher share of capital's 
take of overall national income; an increase not only in inequalities of wealth 
but also in incomes, given the portions coming from capital; and the possibility 
of "super salaries" for the managers of capital assets. Fundamentally, it signals a 
preponderance of capital over labor in the generation and distribution of in-
come and wealth: as Piketty describes it, " [ C] apital reproduces itself faster than 
output increases."12 
But what is behind this inequality? Piketty's argument was popularly asso-
ciated with a "law" expressed in the unexpectedly charismatic inequality r > g, 
meaning the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of economic growth gen-
erally (producing disproportionate accumulation to the wealthy, who hold 
capital). 13 But this expression simply summarizes empirical findings across a 
great variety of settings-from the antebellum plantation South, to the England 
ofJane Austen's marriageable "incomes," to Silicon Valley-disconnected from 
any account of what produces the inequality. As I have argued along with other 
scholars, it is here that lawyers and legal scholars-people who know the insti-
tutional details that Piketty's analysis elides-need to bring their insights to 
bear. 
Over this conference, we have heard from remarkable scholars and practi-
tioners about the different ways that law has interacted with this increasing eco-
nomic inequality over the past decades-sometimes resisting or transforming 
it, but more often conceding to it, consolidating it, and brokering its conversion 
into more basic and worrying inequalities of other kinds, including in access to 
justice and to political power. The next step for legal scholars and activists who 
want to use Piketty's work, it seems to me, is to understand the trends he high-
lighted in light of the legal construction of the economy-and the changing ju-
ridical landscape in America, and elsewhere, across the last half century. In oth-
er words, many of the otherwise disparate trends we have canvassed here-
10. For a set of essays on post-war European economic growth, see INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
IN EUROPE AFTER 1945: WEALTH, POWER AND ECONOMIC (C. Grabas & A. Ni.itze-
nadel eds., 2014). For an analysis that questions the coherence of the post-war 
boom narrative, and identifies divergent trends in different parts and across differ-
ent sectors of the advanced industrial world, see MICHAEL J. WEBBER & DAVID L. 
RIGBY, THE GOLDEN AGE ILLUSION: RETHINKING POST-WAR CAPITALISM 485-86, 
493-95 (1996). 
11. For an overview of this increasing inequality, see Grewal, supra note 3, at 633-4i. 
12. PIKETTY, supra note I, at 57i. 
13. For a discussion of this "law" of capitalism, see Grewal, supra note 3, at 641-44. 
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from the legal consolidation of class through procedural restrictions, to the in-
tersections of racial discrimination and economic inequality, to the increasing 
power of mega-firms and the super-rich-may have a shared context, which 
Piketty' s enormous effort in data collection and analysis helps reveal. 
The surprising success of Piketty's book has a context that is relevant here 
too. Even more surprising than the fact that a seven-hundred-page book filled 
with graphs was a runaway international bestseller-and this, let me emphasize 
as an academic, is amazing-is the fact that a sitting Senator who calls himself a 
"democratic socialist" explained what he means by that to the American people 
on live television in a campaign for the presidency. 14 If I never expected the 
former to happen, I certainly never predicted the latter-at least not in my life-
time. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, a left-wing populist, Jeremy Corbyn, has 
just routed the extremely well-organized and well-financed vestiges of Tony 
Blair's new Labour, 15 while continental Europe is embroiled in major problems 
whose solution, I think, no one can clearly see, but which has sharpened calls 
for democratic transformation. 16 
Both this burst of radical politics and Piketty' s bestseller would be hard to 
imagine without the financial crisis of 2008, which I take it for many of the stu-
dents in this room has been the ongoing backdrop to your late high school, col-
lege, and immediate post-college years. For us who were a bit older-and I 
know many of the folks in this room shared this view, since I was speaking to 
them about it at the time-the extraordinary thing was how calm things seemed 
in 2008 and after, especially given the scale of the calamity. I know that Bob 
Hockett and Jed Purdy both spent time in the Occupy camp at Zuccotti Park, 
doing good work among well-meaning folks, but outside these small erup-
tions-and perhaps especially in the policy world and in establishment circles-
it was as if nothing had happened that a few new financial rules and a massive 
bailout could not fix. From 2008 to about 2014, I think a lot of us were in disbe-
lief about how little elite and mainstream discourses had changed in response to 
the crisis. But it turns out that there were pent-up political frustrations all 
around that finally did emerge. The Piketty phenomenon, Sanders' success, and 
Corbyn's leadership of Labour-and more elsewhere, and surely more to 
come-now attest to that. 
Piketty's detailed empirical analysis helped consolidate a new narrative, 
which we might call the "post-war as exception." This narrative is now in con-
test with an older one, which we might call the "post-war as destiny." Piketty 
showed that the post-war years were exceptional in their brief reversal of the in-
14. Jedediah Purdy, Bernie Sanders's New Deal Socialism, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/bernie-sanderss-new-deal-socialism 
[http://perma.cc/PPM5-5255]. 
15. Rowena Mason, Labour Leadership: Jeremy Corbyn Elected with Huge Mandate, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2015, 8:27 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/ 
sep/12/jeremy-corbyn-wins-labour-party-leadership-election [http://perma.cc/ 
3LDJ-Z2QE]. 
16. For critical analyses of the crisis in Europe, see Susan Watkins, Vanity and Venali-
ty, 35 LONDON REV. BOOKS 17 (2013); and Wolfgang Streeck, Why the Euro Divides 
Europe, 95 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2015). 
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equality between rand g; 17 and this empirical confirmation that they were ex-
ceptional has helped many of us ratify our intuitions that things have not been 
going well in advanced democracies for many decades. 
The other, older narrative is "the post-war as destiny." On this account, the 
post-war miracle was not an exception, but reflected essentially how capitalism 
is supposed to function-and the deviation from positive post-war trends is not 
the return to what Piketty argues is the natural operation of the market, but ra-
ther a distortion of what the natural operation of the market would be, if some 
other factor-usually involving unions or government-could be made to do 
the right thing. 
The ideas of post-war as exception or as destiny implicate different world 
views-with differences not just in what level of inequality in wealth and in-
comes you can expect, and how you interpret them, but in how you understand 
fundamentally the relation between the market and democratic politics. The 
post-war boom allowed for both high growth and widely shared growth. A lot 
of political possibilities emerged from that combination-and if you see the 
post-war as destiny, you will expect these possibilities to continue and probably, 
too, to globalize. 
First, and most important, it became not just desirable, but feasible to think 
of the economy as a managed domain, an engine for the whole country, which 
would chug along at a decent clip, generating surpluses that were widely shared 
among most citizens, all without much need for government redistribution. Of 
course some people might be left out-but their exclusion was rationalized in 
this narrative as the result not of the running of the engine, but of outside fac-
tors, often contingent and ugly ones: racism, sexism, a historical legacy of slav-
ery or colonialism, and poverty traps of one kind or another. And the policy re-
sponse in such a world was the response of post-war liberalism, including post-
war legal liberalism, of which this school has always been such a remarkable 
center.18 Post-war legal liberalism supposed that we could focus on remedying 
particular exclusions without the need for a comprehensive reassessment be-
cause the economy had been tamed through Keynesian planning. And, after all, 
on issues such as inequality, as Piketty has noted, the elite consensus was that 
economic inequality might increase with growth initially, but that further 
growth would eventually tame it-this is the upside-down, U-shaped curve that 
Simon Kuznets famously mapped.19 
More generally, the idea of post-war as destiny consolidated a particular 
picture of the possible and desirable relation between markets and democracy, 
between economics and politics. It also allowed-for a time-those scholars 
and activists concerned with inequality to focus on non-economic exclusions, 
even while they also recognized at some level what we now call "intersectionali-
17. PIKETIY, supra note 1, at 356. 
18. For an account of post-war legal liberalism, see STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 24-57 (2008). 
19. See generally Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1 (1955). For a discussion of Piketty's role in correcting and updating 
this data, see Grewal, supra note 3, at 629-32. 
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ty," 20 which is to say, the way that different kinds of exclusions or subordina-
tions overlap and ramify. But in the post-war years, the problem was not so 
much inequality as it was deprivation: we could thus declare a war on poverty 
without needing also to declare a war on plutocracy. The idea that a tenth of a 
percent of the population would own a quarter of all national assets, as is now 
the case, 21 was not our future, but our past-something from the Gilded Age 
that we thought we had left behind. 
Something changed, of course, and just what it is will continue to be the 
subject of research and controversy. But the facts on the ground seem to have 
changed much more quickly than our narrative about them. This is probably 
because the narrative of post-war as destiny is intimately tied to the idea of the 
American dream to which it gave rise. 
We can and should put all this in concrete generational terms. The parents 
of the boomers returned from the war to an economic miracle that lasted to 
roughly the end of their lifetimes. The boomers grew up in the post-war excep-
tion, and learned to take it for granted during their formative years. These two 
generations are not just your grandparents or possibly your parents, depending 
on your age; they are the people who helped to describe and rationalize, in all 
the elite discourses of culture, media, and academia, and to inscribe in poliCy, in 
all the ways that policy happens, including through law, a vision of the United 
States as an inclusive democracy in which the terms of economic life had been 
more or less settled. 
This was a wonderful ideal. But what the "post-war as exception" narrative 
now emphasizes is that it was underwritten by a socioeconomic context that 
was fading just as those discourses and policies were becoming entrenched. As 
Wolfgang Streeck argued in a series of compelling works, the history since the 
mid-197os across a large swathe of advanced economies-prominently but not 
just the United States-can be understood as a series of ultimately futile efforts 
to replicate the conditions of the post-war miracle even after they no longer ex-
isted. 22 These efforts tried to hide the fact that the glorious years were over-
first through inflationary politics in the 1970s; then through the massive expan-
sion of public debt in the i98os; and then in the privatization of that debt under 
conditions oflow interest rates in the i99os and 20oos-with the result that on-
ly the financial crisis of 2008 really laid bare: that the trentes glorieuses are over. 
We must now return to the fundamental questions concerning the organization 
of economic life with an understanding of the post-war as exception-not, alas, 
as destiny. 
20. For a seminal discussion, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection 
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
21. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucmamo14 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7SPK-HLBX]. 
22. WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC 
CAPITALISM (2014); Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW 
LEFT REV. 5 (2011). 
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We may see all of this clearly enough now, but it was not very clear when I 
was a student here at Yale in the 1990s. In fact, the contradiction between how 
we were supposed to understand our world and how it actually was proved a 
source of tremendous frustration and puzzlement for me as a student and 
young adult, no doubt like many of the other panelists. 23 My late high school, 
college, and immediate post-college years were spent not in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, but in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold 
War. At that time, the collapse of the Soviet Union was widely interpreted not 
as the particular failure of a distorted political regime with its highly inegalitari-
an socioeconomic system, but as the vindication of the "post-war as destiny" 
narrative. Perhaps paradoxically, but tellingly, the collapse of the Soviet system 
did not open up a new space for critical self-reflection in the United States. Ra-
ther, it helped to consolidate a conception of the market and its relation to 
democratic politics that had been losing its plausibility for about fifteen years 
already. 
What orientation should we have to our new dispensation? The narrative of 
"post-war as exception" suggests rather naturally that we look back, before the 
post-war miracle, to draw lessons and insights from past struggles for justice, 
including economic justice. What were people who cared about inequality and 
exclusion-exclusion on grounds of class, race, gender, citizenship status, and 
so on-doing and thinking in earlier decades of the twentieth century? When 
we look back to when America was last in a Gilded Age, we see the rise of Pro-
gressivism, a renewed commitment to democracy in many forms, and a funda-
mental struggle over the constitutional order of the republic. Considering that 
history, we should be hesitant to attribute the post-war economic miracle to re-
construction after the war, as Piketty sometimes suggests; it was also what an 
economy looked like that had been tamed through new laws in a new regulatory 
regime, set up after decades of earlier struggle. 
The post-war as exception narrative also suggests that we should scrutinize 
the mainstream views of law, politics, and economics that grew up during and 
depend upon that exception. Chief among these are the separation of public 
and private law into distinct domains in which one aims at efficiency and the 
other deals with public values and redistribution. This fundamental framing 
persists in large and small ways in much legal scholarship and in the organiza-
tion of legal instruction, and many of the speakers at this conference have em-
phasized these and other elements of legal pedagogy and practice as things to 
criticize and change. 
The old view was that markets would self-correct in relevant respects; the 
new view has to be that they will not, and that they cannot be considered the 
default state of affairs but rather policy tools whose unequalizing effect must be 
23. For a personal account of what it was like to be a young intellectual on the left at 
that time, see Jedediah Purdy, The Accidental Neoliberal, 19 N+i 17 (2014). Purdy 
now understands his first book, For Common Things, which achieved national 
recognition, as "a symptom of the time ... between 1989 when I was 14 and the 
Berlin Wall fell, and 2008, when the financial crisis brought capitalism into fresh 
question." Id. at 18 (I was Purdy's Yale Law School roommate at the time his first 
book appeared, and I share his memory of what it felt like trying to think against 
the grain at that juncture in history). 
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guarded against. But as lawyers we know that the devil is in the details: and the 
details of any regulatory scheme leave open many possible points of capture, as 
our speakers have made all too clear. And it is not obvious how to build an ad-
ministrative state capable of deploying market relations to democratic effect 
without reworking democracy and administration in some fundamental ways 
that we have not yet started thinking about deeply enough. 
To put all this much more plainly: if post-war legal liberalism had a neces-
sary economic context, then those of us who share its values must now think 
deeply and perhaps more radically about the economy, which we can no longer 
take for granted as a machine that generates the material basis for our demo-
cratic life. 
This brings me to the final orientation, which necessarily goes beyond intel-
lectual diagnosis, since we cannot simply allow this criticism of our condition to 
remain theoretical, as many folks have emphasized over the last few days. To 
make good on justice and the rule of law, we need to look to institutional solu-
tions, and these will take time. Jacob Hacker yesterday mentioned the cynicism 
that afflicts most ordinary citizens, who mistrust politics and thus end up ced-
ing power to an organized super-elite. I understand this cynicism, and suspect 
that many of us share it, at least in our weak moments. But I think this cynicism 
thrives on our misconstrual of the relation between hope and action. I learned 
from Roberto Unger that getting this relation right is crucial: if you think that 
action follows hope, you will remain immobilized, passive in the face of so 
many seeming "facts-on-the-ground" and highly elaborated reasons for which 
any transformative action will fail. But this is the wrong way around. Hope does 
not precede and enable action. It follows it. Action discloses the reasons for 
hope: it reveals the possibilities for transformation, and that is what generates 
hope. 24 
But how is it possible to act without hope? I think it is only possible in soli-
darity-when you are acting with others, and for them-and here I must thank 
once again my fellow panelists, the audience members, and especially the stu-
dent-organizers for helping me to feel that solidarity as we together confront a 
world in which we must learn again to think and to act in powerful new ways. 
Thank you. 
24. See CORNELL WEST & ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
PROGRESSIVISM: AN INITIATIVE FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM 11 (1999) 
("For hope is more the consequence of action than its cause."); see also ROBERTO 
MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 244-46 (1984). 
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